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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final judgments entered in domestic cases by the District
Court for the State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §782a-3(2)(h), and Rule 3(e), Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW
In summary, this appeal challenges the Trial Court Order
dismissing the Petitioner's action for divorce. More
specifically Appellant presents the following issues for
review.
1.

The Trial Court misapplied Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5

(1987) both procedurally and substantively as a statute
limiting subject matter jurisdiction.

Interpretation of

statutory language is reviewed for correctness without
deference to the lower court's ruling.

Gramlich v. Munsey,

839 P.2d 1131,1332 (Utah, 1992)
A.

The improper application of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 (1987)

permitted Mr. Snarr to file last minute dispositive motions
without complying to the appropriate Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
B.

If timely, Mr. Snarr's motion is nevertheless waived
1

by the four corners of the parties' pleadings.
2.

In arguendo, if U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 (1987) is

applicable to the case at bar, the statute is an
unconstitutional restriction of Ms. Snarr's access to a
court for a remedy pursuant to Utah State Constitution, Art.
I. Section 11. The constitutionality of a statute is
reviewed for correctness, if the issue is properly reserved
on the record and briefed at the lower court. Aroax
Magnesium Corp. V. Utah Stat.fi Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256

(Utah 1990).

These issues were presented to the Trial Court

immediately upon the filing of Mr. Snarr's last minute
motion. (R.130,160,209, 227; Tr.7-8,20)
3.

The Appellant is entitled to attorney's fees and the

matter should be remanded with instructions on that issue.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are believed to be determinative and bear directly on
the issues related to this appeal.
RULES:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(c);
TTt-ah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(h);
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(i);
2

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h);
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(3)(g);
STATUTES:
Utah Corte Annotated §30-1-4.5 (1987)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 11;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from a final order entered by the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on
March 2, 1999, dismissing the Petitioner's action for
divorce.
The parties were originally married in 1969.(R.23)

They

had two children and divorced the first time in 1980.(R.23)
Within a short time period thereafter, they returned living
together and raising their two minor children (R.2,23,33)
In July, 1996, the Snarr's separated for the second
time.

The relationship ended on approximately July 7, 1996.

(R.33) Throughout 1980 to 1996, the parties held themselves
out as husband and wife.(R.1,6)

Ms. Snarr had not been

employed (R. 36) in the private sector between 1992 and the
time of separation.(R.24)

As a result of the death of the
3

parties oldest son in 1992, Ms. Snarr became depressed.
(R.25)

She received psychotherapy from 1992 through 1997

(R.25) and had other significant physical health problems.
(R.25,72-3,)
After separation and in approximately September, 1997,
Ms. Snarr obtained a retail sales position at Fred
Meyer's.(R.72)

That employment continued until injuring her

back from the pre-existing problems and surgery in 1996
(R.72-3,94-100).

After Pre-trial Conferences before the

Commissioner and the assigned Judge, the matter was
scheduled for trial.(R.93)

On the day of trial, August 12,

1998, Mr. Snarr filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon the
Common Law Marriage Statute, Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5
(1987).(R.124)

The Trial Court granted the motion after

further briefing and argument on March 2, 1999.
Ms. Snarr claims she is entitled to a divorce and Mr.
Snarr's waived the affirmative defenses presented for the
first time on the day of trial.
Course of the Proceedings
The parties lived together from 1969 to July 7, 1996.
(R.23,33).

In 1980, they separated and divorced.

However,

the began living together shortly thereafter.(Mr. Snarrfs
4

Affidavit,R.33)

Mr. Snarr admits these allegations

contained in paragraph 2 of the Ms. Snarr's Petition
(Complaint).
12.(R.6)

(See Respondent's Answer to Complaint,

Throughout this time period (1980-96) the parties

held themselves out as husband and wife. (Respondent's
Answer, 12,R.6; Mr. Snarr's Affidavit,1iv,R.35)
After the parties separated on July 7, 1996, Ms. Snarr
filed her action for divorce on October 7, 1996.(R.l) After
the parties explored the possibility of settlement, (Tr.2)
the Respondent (Mr. Snarr) filed his Answer to Complaint on
February 14, 1997. He also contemporaneously filed a
^Request for Trial Setting'.(R.9) Discovery was pursued from
April through August, 1997.(R.12,14,16,19)
Snarr's theory of the case.

According to Mr.

The entire litigation must be

completed within one (1) year from the ^termination of the
relationship'.

According to Mr. Snarr's theory, that one

year expired on July 7, 1997.
Although Mr. Snarr claims the trial court lost
jurisdiction after July, 1997, he thereafter pursued the
following proceedings.

Mr. Snarr stipulated to temporary

alimony and to maintain Ms. Snarr's health insurance in
September, 1997.(R.31)

In addition to the ^Request for
5

Trial Setting' filed in February, 1997, Mr. Snarr filed
^Certificate of Readiness for Trial' in late September,
1997.(R.59)

A Pre-Trial Conference was rescheduled by

agreement from October, 1997 (R.64) and held before
Commissioner Evans on November 3, 1997.(R.69)

The matter

was certified by the Court Commissioner to the assigned
Judge, Honorable Anne M. Stirba, presiding.(R.69)
The parties further stipulated to more informal
discovery in November, 1997.(R.86-91)

The Pre-Trial

Conference before the assigned trial judge was held in
March, 1998.(R.92)

At that time, the first trial date was

set for May 27, 1998.(R.93) Mr. Snarr never raised any issue
regarding subject matter jurisdiction in either Pre-Trial
Conference before the Commissioner or the assigned trial
Judge.
Due to changes in Ms. Snarr's health and employment, she
filed a motion to amend the prior Order for temporary
alimony on March 9, 1998.(R.94-5)

A hearing was scheduled

on her motion for April 27, 1998,(R.102) but not heard due
to the proximity of the May trial date. Mr. Snarr filed a
responsive Affidavit.

As described in greater detail below,

Mr. Snarr did not seek a dismissal of the divorce action in
6

this responsive pleading filed on April 24, 1997, nine (9)
months after the alleged statute of limitations issue became
ripe.

Instead, Mr. Snarr argued the *Jones' factors

regarding alimony.

Mr. Snarr's affidavit also seeks to

defer a ruling until the May trial date. (R.110,113)
Due to a calendar conflict by the Trial Court, the lower
court continued the May 27th date, six days prior to trial.
(R.122-3) The trial was rescheduled for August 12, 1998.
On August 10, 1998, two days prior to trial, counsel for
Mr. Snarr mailed his Motion to Dismiss to opposing counsel.
The Motion to Dismiss is actually filed on the day of
trial.(R.124)
Mr. Snarr's Motion to Dismiss was made pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and based
upon Utah's Common Law Marriage statute, Utah Code Annotated
§30-1-4.5 (1987).(R.124)
Trial Court Disposition
On August 12, 1998, the Trial Court received oral
arguments and the matter was continued for further briefing
and argument.

The matter was referred back to the Court

Commissioner and Recommendations were entered by the
Honorable Michael S. Evans, Court Commissioner, on December
7

2, 1998. Ms. Snarr filed timely Objections to
Commissioner's Recommendations on December 14, 1998.(R.214)
and further hearing was held before the assigned Trial Judge
on February 11, 1999.(R.245)

The Honorable Anne M. Stirba

affirmed the Court Commissioner's Recommendations and
entered an Order on March 2, 1999, dismissing Ms. Snarr's
divorce action pursuant to Utah Corig Annotated §30-14.5(1987).(R.228-9)
Ms. Snarr filed her Notice of Appeal on March 30, 1999.
(R.231)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the case are undisputed between the
parties.

Mr. and Ms. Snarr were originally married in

1969.(R.23) They had two children from this marriage and
both born prior to 1980.(R.23)

In 1980, the parties

separated and divorced. However within a short period
thereafter, they again resided together with the
children.(R.2,23,33)

The parties continued to reside

together and hold themselves out as husband and wife until
July 7, 1996.(R.1,6)
Upon the parties physical separation, Mr. Snarr left the
marital residence.(R.34)

On October 7, 1996, Ms. Snarr
8

filed her Divorce Complaint and alleged in pertinent part
that,
"12. Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband having
been first married in 1969 later divorced in 1980, however,
they continued to reside together and held themselves out as
husband and wife from February, 1980 to the date the (sic)
separated on approximately July 7, 1996.
13. During the course of the marriage irreconcilable
differences have arisen between the parties making the
continuation of the marital relationship impossible.
111. The parties acquired various debts and obligations
incurred during the marriage. It is reasonable that said
debts and obligations be divided between the parties in a
fair and equitable manner.
113. Each party should be ordered to do whatever is
necessary to implement the terms of the Decree of Divorce to
be entered herein, including but not limited to transferring
all necessary items of property, titles, deeds, documents or
any other item necessary to comply with the terms of the
Decree of Divorce.(R.1-3)
The above allegations of Petitioner's Complaint were
unequivocally admitted by Mr. Snarr in is Answer.(R.5-7) In
addition, Mr. Snarr's prayer for relief contained the
following request, "WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays that a
Decree of Divorce be entered in accordance with terms of his
Answer."(R.7) (Emphasis in the Original)
Between October 7, 1996 and February, 1997 the parties
explored the possibilities of settlement.

That effort was

exhausted and Mr. Snarr filed an Answer on February 14,
9

1997.(R.5)

Contemporaneously, a Request for Trial Setting

was filed on February 14, 1997.(R.9)
The only affirmative defense asserted by Mr. Snarr in
his original and only responsive pleading to the Complaint
is a general averment of *failure to state a claim upon
which may be granted' without reference to either a statute
or a rule of procedure.(R.5-7)
Mr. Snarr asserted that Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5(1987)
is a procedural statute that limits subject matter
jurisdiction 1 year after the parties terminated their
relationship.

To that end, Mr. Snarr filed a Motion to

Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), U.R-Civ.P,r on the day of
trial.

Mr. Snarr's motion was filed 25 months after the

parties separated and 13 months after the supposed door
closed on subject matter jurisdiction.
During that intervening 13 months, Mr. Snarr stipulated
to temporary alimony and continuation of his ex-wife's
health insurance.

Mr. Snarr also participated in two Pre-

trial conferences without raising any claimed deficiency in
Petitioner's complaint.
It is undisputed that Mr. Snarr's motion does not
comport to either Rule 6, nt.ah Rules of Civil Procedure, or
10

4-501, Corifi of Judicial Administration.

Under the guise

that the issue is subject matter in nature, the Trial Court
entertained the motion and ultimately ruled against Ms.
Snarr, dismissing her divorce action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Respondent/Appellee inappropriately and untimely
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the day of trial. Mr. Snarr
asserts the Trial Court lost subject matter jurisdiction
unless all proceedings are complete within one year from the
date of the parties' separation.
The Trial Court erred by hearing the untimely motion on
the day of trial. Mr. Snarr neither pled a specific statute
as an affirmative defense as required by Rule 9, n.R.Civ.P.
nor did he file his dispositive motion in accordance with
Rule 4-501, C.J.A.f during the preceding 13 months.
The statute in question is simply an inarticulate
statute of limitations.

It is unique in that it requires

all proceedings to be completed within 1 year from the date
of separation.

Unlike most statute of limitations which

dictate a time period to initiate an action, Utah Code
Annotated §30-1-4.5 (1987), requires termination of all
proceedings within a finite period (one year).
11

Assuming arguendo that Utah Code Annotated §30-1-4.5
(1989) is not a statute of limitations, it is an
unconstitutional restriction upon Ms. Snarr's access

to

courts pursuant to Art. I, Section 11, Utah State
Constitution.
These issues were preserved before the trial court and
fully briefed below.(R.130,160,209, 227; Tr.7-8,20)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT INAPPROPRIATELY APPLIED D.C.A. §30-1-4.5
SUBPOINT A
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS NOT TIMELY.
This matter was originally scheduled for trial on May
27, 1998.

Prior to that date, Mr. Snarr did not file any

dispositive motions.

Approximately 77 days elapsed between

the original trial date and the second trial date (August
12, 1998).

It is undisputed that Mr. Snarr filed this

Motion to Dismiss on the day of trial.
At trial, Ms. Snarr did not waive the issue of
timeliness.(Tr.2)

Instead, she preferred to argue the

motion as opposed to continuing the matter for a third trial
date.
12

Rule 6(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states,
For motions - Affidavits. A written motion, other
than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days
before the time specified for the hearing, unless a
different period is fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501,
or by order of the court.
It is undisputed that Mr. Snarr did not meet any of the
exceptions of Rule 6(d), and therefore the Motion to Dismiss
was not timely.
The timeliness of dispositive motions is further
addressed in Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4501(3)(g).
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least
thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No
dispositive motions shall be heard after that date
without leave of the Court.
The obvious reason for these time constraints is to
avoid the exact procedure employed by Mr. Snarr herein.
Namely, an eleventh hour allegation that could obviate the
need for a trial.

The entire purpose of Rule 6 and Rule 4-

501 are circumvented by the Mr. Snarr's last minute maneuver
in the case at bar. (Tn r<? Mr.Cnner 717 P.2d 701 (Utah, 1986).
SUBPOINT B
MR. SNARR WAIVED HIS MOTION TO DISMISS.
Although Mr. Snarr captioned his Motion to Dismiss as a
13

subject matter jurisdiction issue, it simply employs U.C.A.
§30-1-4.5(1987).

Mr. Snarr's motion is more aptly

interpreted as a statute of limitations.

However, that

interpretation is qualified because of the unusual language
contained in §30-1-4.5.

Counsel is unaware and can not

locate any statute with similar restrictions requiring a
finite date to complete litigation.
Mr. Snarr's attempt to characterize his motion by
captioning the same as a subject matter jurisdiction is an
adept effort to frame the issue in a favorable manner for
Mr. Snarr.

However, Mr. Snarr's mischaracterization does

not divorce the trial court of jurisdiction.

The Utah

Supreme Court reviewed this very issue in an Industrial
Commission case.

In American Coal Co. V. Sandstromf 689

P.2d 1 (Utah, 1984), the Utah Supreme Court specifically
precluded raising a statute of limitations for the first
time on appeal.

In analyzing the maneuver, the Court stated

that statute of limitations are not jurisdictional and
therefore can be waived. Id at 4.

The Utah Supreme Court's

holding in Sandstromr has been followed by this Court in
James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 571 (Utah Ct. Appeal, 1998).
This analysis is consistent with Rule 8(c) U.R-Civ.P.
14

Rule 8(c) states in mandatory language, x...a party shall
set forth affirmatively... statute of limitations ...'
(Emphasis Added)

Although Mr. Snarr may desire to caption

his motion as ^subject matter', the label does not alter the
contents of the statute of limitations.

The affirmative

defense was waived.
POINT II
MR. SNARR WAIVED ANY SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSE CREATED BY
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-1-4.5 (1987).
SUBPOTNT A
MR. SNARR'S PLEADINGS ADMITTED A MARITAL RELATIONSHIP.
Mr. Snarr filed his Answer on approximately February 14,
1997, seven (7) months after the parties final separation.
(Appellee/Respondent's Answer, Seef Addendum p.31).

In

pertinent part, Mr. Snarr unequivocally admitted the
following allegations from Petitioner's Complaint filed
October 7, 1996.
"12. Plaintiff and defendant arfi wife and husband
having been first married in 1969 later divorced in
1980, however, they continued to reside together and
held themselves out as husband and wife from February,
1980 to the date of the (sic) separated on approximately
July 7, 1996. (Emphasis Added)
f3.During the nourse of the marriage irreconcilable

differences have arisen between the parties making
continuation of the marital relationship.(Emphasis
15

Added)
19. The parties have acquired a home and real
property during the course of the marriage...
110. The parties have acquired an interest in
various items of personal property including, but not
limited to, an interest in'Auto Trend (sic) furniture,
furniture, (sic) furnishing, appliances, bank and
retirement accounts, automobiles and travel trailer,
stocksf securities and other assets. It is reasonable
that said personal property be divided between the
parties in a fair and equitable manner.(Emphasis Added)
113. Each party should be ordered to do whatever is
necessary to implement the terms of the Decree of
Divorce to be entered herein, including but not limited
to transferring all necessary items of property, titles,
deeds, documents or any other item necessary to comply
with the terms of the Decree of Divorce. (Emphasis
Added)
In addition to these blanket admissions, the Defendant
made a specific prayer for relief, "WHEREFORE, the Defendant
prays that a Decree of Divorce be entered in accordance with
terms of his Answer." (Emphasis in the Original)
(Respondent's Answer, p.3)
It was reasonable for Ms. Snarr to rely upon the
unamended and unequivocal admissions in Respondent's Answer.
It is now disingenuous for the Mr. Snarr to claim he wanted
anything other than a divorce.

But for a creative eleventh

hour claim under nt.ah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5, a divorce trial
would have been conducted on August 12, 1998.
16

The importance of the above emphasized references to Ms.
Snarr's Complaint shows the specific intent of the Mr. Snarr
until the day of trial.

He admitted various items of

personal property were acquired during the marriage.
emphasized items were all acquired after 1980.

The

This is an

explicit admission that a marital relationship existed after
1980.

He further admits joint interest in the property

acquired after 1980. Until August 12th, everyone was
preparing for a divorce trial.
Mr. Snarr's theory concludes that one (1) year after
separation, (July, 1997) his remedy changed.

However, the

record contains more evidence demonstrating both parties
reliance upon the pleadings. After his remedy supposedly
changed, Mr. Snarr engaged in the following proceedings. On
September 25, 1997, the Respondent stipulated to temporary
alimony. He attended two (2) pretrial conferences (November,
1997 and March, 1998).

He prepared for trial in May, 1998

until a last minute calendar change on the court's own
motion.

He then permitted 75 days elapse between trial

dates before submitting the motions in question.

It was

thirteen (13) months after the triggering date cited by
Respondent, before he acted.
17

By the Respondent's own acquiescence, he waived the
claimed defenses.
SUBPOINT B
Pursuant to U.R.Civ,P.f Mr. Snarr Waived All Defenses.
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5, is a specific statutory
defense with which specificity must be pled.

Rule 9(h),

U-R-Civ-P- states:
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the
statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the
facts showing the defense but it may be alleged
generally that the cause of action is barred by the
provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or
describing such statute specifically and definitely by
section number/ subsection designation, if any/ or
otherwise designating the provision relied upon
sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation
is controverted/ the party pleading the statute must
establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the
cause of action is so barred. (Emphasis Added)
It is uncontroverted that Mr. Snarr made no affirmative
defenses and did not plead any specificity regarding the
statute upon which he now relies.

In Wasatch Mings Co. V.

Hopkinsonf 465 P. 1007, (Utah, 1970) the Utah Supreme Court
upheld the necessity to specify a statutory defense in an
answer.

Specifically in that case, the defendant made a

general plea of statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense.

However, the defendant was not specific in regard

to what statutory bar may be present.
18

The Utah Supreme

Court therefore held the defendant waived the issue.
Parenthetically, the Utah Supreme Court noted that if a
specific statute had been referred to by defendant,
plaintiff's claims would have been barred. Id. at fnote 6.
SUBPOINT C
Rule 8(c)fii.R.Civ.P.r Mandates Affirmative Defenses Be Pled.
Rule 8(c), U.R.Civ.P. is applicable to the case at bar.
This rule states:
(c)Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord
and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of
risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy,
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license,
payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds,
Statute Qf limitations, waiver, and any other matter

constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. when a
party has mistakenly designated a defense as a
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court
on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the
pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.
(Emphasis Added)
This policy if also repeated in Rule 12(h), U.R.Civ.P.r
and failure to plead an affirmative defense is a waiver of
that claim.

In Wasftacha v. Terra, 528 P.2d 902, (Utah,

1974) the attempt to add an accord and satisfaction as a
defense, one (1) week before trial was denied by the trial
court and affirmed on appeal.
As stated earlier, in American Coal Co. V. Sandstromf
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689 P. 2d 1 (Utah, 1984) the Utah Supreme Court specifically
stated that a statute of limitation defense is not a
jurisdictional defense and therefore can be waived.
In summary, Mr. Snarr sat upon his hands for 22 months
prior to filing the Motion to Dismiss.

Mr. Snarr's conduct

in these proceedings after the alleged triggering date in
1997, is proof positive of the omission of his affirmative
defenses.

Finally, the Rules of Civil Procedure require

specificity when relying upon a statute or a defense of
statute of limitations.

Although it may be a creative

eleventh hour effort, it fails to meet the basic
requirements of notice pleading.
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-1-4.5 (1987) IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID.
If the Court should forgive the absence and timeliness
of Respondent's Affirmative Defense, the statute relied upon
is unconstitutional.

The statute in questions states as

follows:
§30-1-4.5 (1987)
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to
this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or
administrative order establishes that it arises out of a
contract between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized
marriage under the provisions of this chapter;
20

(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and
obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage
under this section must occur during the relationship
described in Subsection (1), or within one year following
the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any
form, and may be proved under the same general rules of
evidence as facts in other cases.
Two Utah Court of Appeals cases regarding the Common Law
marriage statute, make reference to the questionable
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5(1987).
In Rnnnh v. Englehorn, 906 P. 2d 918, fnote 3, (Utah Ct. App.,
1995), and Hansen v. Hansen, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 28,
fnote 2, (Utah Ct. App., 1998) the Court of Appeals
footnoted its concern with open access to courts based upon
the time restrictions dictated by the statute.
The Petitioner is unaware of any other statute that
terminates a remedy after initiating the legal action within
the prescribed time periods.
are statutes of repose.

The only analogous statutes

This is not to be confused with

statute of limitations.
The Utah Supreme Court articulated the difference
between such statutes in Sun Valley Water Beds v. Herm
Hughes & Son, Inc. r 782 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1989) and Berry
21

ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672
(Utah 1985).

As cited in Velarde v. Board of Review of

Indus, CoTrmi'n.r 831 P.2d 123, (1992) the Court of Appeals
reiterates the distinctions•
Although a statute of repose is similar to a statute of
limitations, the two operate differently. A statute of
limitations precludes suit a statutorily specified
number of years after a cause of action accrues. A
statute of repose, on the other hand, prevents suit a
statutorily specified number of years after a particular
event occurs, without regard to when the cause of action
accrues. Hence, a statute of repose may bar the filing
of a lawsuit even though the cause of action did not
arise until after the action was barred and although the
injured person was diligent in seeking a remedy.
Although such statutes have passed constitutional muster
in other states, see Horton Y, GQldminerfs Daughter, 785
P.2d 1087, 1091 n.3 (Utah 1989), Utah courts have
interpreted the open courts provision of the Utah
Constitution to proscribe statutes of repose unless the
statutes have certain redeeming characteristics, at 125.
Utah Const, Art. I, § 11, states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.
The Utah Supreme Court makes the most thorough analysis
of the State's Constitutions application to statutes of
repose in Bfirry v> Rftenhnraft. Id.

22

Although we may not apply section 11 "in a
mechanical fashion to strike every statute with which
there may be conflict," Berry, 717 P.2d at 680, the
section imposes serious limits on the legislature's
power to deny plaintiffs their existing common law
rights and remedies.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test which
contemplates both the individual rights constitutionally
protected by the open courts provision and the legislative
interest in promoting the social and economic welfare.
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides
an injured person an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy "by due course of law" for
vindication of his constitutional interest. The benefit
provided by the substitute must be substantially equal
in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in
providing essentially comparable substantive protection
to onefs person, property, or reputation, although the
form of the substitute remedy may be different. . . .
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of
action may be justified only if there is a clear social
or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective
Id. at
680 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, no specified alternative remedy
exists. Although §4.5(1) makes a vague reference to an
*administrative order', nothing is defined regarding the
agency (state or federal) or procedure that could be
commenced and completed to escape the one (1) year death
knell of Subsection 2.
23

Second, no clear social or economic evil can be
articulated or reasonably achieved by a process uniquely
defined by the date of completion versus date of
commencement.

The Legislative History is similarly silent

regarding the purpose of this unique provision.

(See

Addendum, p.35)
Therefore, this statute is not constitutionally viable.
POINT IV
APPELLANT IS ENTITLEiD TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The Appellant requested but was denied attorney's fees
at the trial court.(R.3,112; R.229,13)

Ms. Snarr has

obviously limited resources and ability to pay in pursuing
this matter on appeal.(R.70-83)

Appellant should prevail on

the merits and the matter of attorney's fees should be
remanded with instructions to determine the appropriateness
of fees for Ms. Snarr pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §30-3-3
CONCLUSION
Mr. Snarr failed to make a timely motion on the merits
of his issue.

He further failed to preserve the issue in

any pleadings during the salient period he claims the trial
court lost jurisdiction.

These procedures are void of any

claim of subject matter jurisdiction before filing a Motion
24

to Dismiss on the day of trial.
Should the Court believe Mr. Snarr's position entitles a
review of Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5, the statute is
constitutionally flawed.

However the statute is categorized

(limitations, repose, or in artful), it clearly limits Ms.
Snarr's right to obtain redress in the Courts as is
protected by Utah State Constitution, Art. I, Section 11.
DATED thisj2>2 day of October, 1999.

^ L . G. CUTLER
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, by first
class mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Appellant's Brief, on thisj2jZ

day of

October, 1999, to Stephen W. Cook, Attorney for Respondent,
at 323 South 600 East, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102.
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ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS
AND
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION
(March 2, 1999)
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

STEPHEN W COOK. USB #0720
STEPHEN W COOK, P C
Attorney for Respondent
323 South 600 East. Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801)595-8600
Telefax (801)595-8614
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TERRY DEE SNARR.
Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS
OBJECTIONS AND ORDER
DISMISSING A CTON

vs
KENNETH GUY SNARR,
Respondent

Civil No 964904304
Judge Ana M Stirba

The Petitioner's Objections To Commissioner's Recommendation came
regularly before the Court, the Honorable Am M Striba, District Court Judge,
presiding, on Febmary 11, 1998, at the hour of 9 00 a m The Petitioner was present
and was represented by her counsel, L G Cutler The Respondent was present and
was represented by his counsel, Stephen W Cook After having heard the arguments
of counsel, after having reviewed the Court's file, including the Commissioner's
Recommendation for correctness, and after having been fully advised in the
premises, the Court finds and concludes that the material facts are not in dispute,
finds and concludes that the Petitioner had an opportunity to comply with Utah's

common law marriage statute, Section 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953). as amended, but
failed to do so, finds and concludes that the decision of Bunch v. Englehorn. 906
P.2d 918 (Ut.Ct.App. 1995) is controlling, finds and concludes that the
Commissioner's Recommendation is correct as a matter of law. and finds and
concludes that for the reasons set forth in the Commissioner's recommendations and
the arguments of Respondent that the Petitioner's Objections To Commissioner's
Recommendation should be denied.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. The Petitioner's Objections To Commissioner's Recommendation are
hereby denied.
2. The above-entitled action is hereby dismissed with prejudice
3. The parties' requests for attorney's fees are denied and each party shall
assume and pay their own respective court costs and attorney's fees
DATED this 2 ^ d a y of

O ^ i * tl^

, 1999.
BYTHECOU^^?^

JWLR
DISTRICT
CWK^W^T^

7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
'SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says.
That he is the attorney for Respondent herein; and that he served the attached
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS AND ORDER DISMISSING
ACTON upon:
L.G. CUTLER
Attorney at Law
5995 South Traditions Lane
Salt Lake City. Utah 84123
by placing a taie and conect copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the same,
sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake
City, Utah, on the ^ g ^ day of February, 1999

jd. <& fUL
STEPHEN W. COOK
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ 2 day of February. 1999.

Notan, P^'IC """ T
KAREMLKNUTSQN I
1615 cssi 0s53e Oranoe Avenue I
Salt Lake O v Utah84i24
I
M> Corrnrsion Expires
Dc ember 30. P0D0
f

1V>

DISTRICT COURT RULING
February 11, 1999
Tr. 20-2

29

THE COURT:
MR. CUTLER:

Uh-huh.
- and is silent as to, you know, any

other reason other that what's contained within the dicta
and the holding —
THE COURT:
MR. CUTLER:

Uh-huh.
— but I don't see anything in the

dicta or the holding that says it is subject-matter
jurisdiction.
THE COURT:
MR. CUTLER:
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.
So that's my answer.
I see. All right.

I —

Thank you,

Mr. Cutler.
This case poses some challenge, and I appreciate
the thoroughness with which counsel has prepared, both
before the commissioner and here today in oral argument. I
have not run across a provision like this statute either,
where there is a duty to see that litigation is completed
within a certain time period, although certainly litigation
of this type can be completed within the time period
prescribed by the legislature.

It's not an impossibility.

But the obligation of making the Court aware of
the time restrictions is on — clearly has to be on the one
who's claiming the common-law marriage, because the
obligations are on that person to comply with the statute,
and also to show that the elements of a common-law marriage

20

exist.

I have considered the arguments, and I'm prepared to

rule at this time.
It appears to the Court that the

Engelbert

decision is controlling in this matter, and the Court is
obliged to follow that law.

It appears that the court was

upholding the decision of Judge Eves based on an assessment
that the statute was jurisdictional and it can't be made
into something else, a statute of limitations by the trial
court in the wake of the appellate decision.
And in addition, the reasoning of the commissioner
appears to this Court to be sound in the other respects
articulated by Commissioner Evans, and the Court finds that
the commissioner — and the review, of course, of the
commissioner's recommendation is, well, one of correctness,
to borrow from the appellate phrase, because it's only a
recommendation from the commissioner.
But the material facts do not appear to have been
in dispute, either before the commissioner or presented here
today, and it appears to the Court: that the commissioner was
correct as a matter of law in his analysis.
Accordingly, for those reasons and rhe others
articulated by respondent, the objection is respectfully
overruled.
I'd like Mr. Cook to prepare an order consistent
with that ruling, and I thank you folks and gcod luck to
21
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MR. COOK:
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THE COURT:
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(Proceedings concluded at 9:30 a.m.
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Thank you.
The court's in recess.
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PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT
R.1-4
October 7, 1996
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A* (X, L. G. CUTLER, #0789
NTJ* Attorney for Plaintiff
^ U S 560 East 200 South, Suite 220
^
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
^
Telephone: (801) 355-1896
Facsimile: (801) 521-5468

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TERRY DEE SNARR,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

vs.

.1 NO.

KENNETH GUY SNARR,

Civi]

Defendant.

Judge

Cft,t90W*3>A

JJDGE A N N E * * * *

Plaintiff, Terry Dee Snarr, hereby alleges and states as a
cause of action against the defendant as follows:
1.

Plaintiff

and defendant are residents of Salt Lake

County, State of Utah and have been for more than three months
immediately prior to the filing of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband having been

first married

in 1969 later divorced

in 1980, however, they

continued to reside together and held themselves out as husband and
wife from February, 1980 to the date the separated on approximately
July 7, 1996.
3.

During

the

course

of

the

marriage

irreconcilable

differences have arisen between the parties making continuation of
the marital relationship impossible.

4.

During the course of the marriage, two (2) children have

been born as issue to this marriage. One child is now deceased and
the remaining child is emancipated.
5.

The defendant is currently and historically employed in

two jobs.

His primary employment is with Yellow Freight Company

and has gross monthly income of approximately $3,000.

He is also

self-employed as a car salesman, doing business as Auto Trend
Motors. The plaintiff has historically assisted the defendant with
various accounting and clerical functions on a part time basis.
6.

The plaintiff is not currently employed and has not been

employed for approximately the last five years except her part-time
assistance with the automobile sales business.
7.

It is reasonable

that the defendant be ordered

to

maintain the health and accident insurance currently available
through his place of employment for the benefit of the plaintiff
until further order of the Court.

It is further reasonable that

the said insurance policy be made available to the plaintiff at the
plaintiff's option pursuant the COBRA provisions of the health
insurance plan.
8.

The plaintiff has a reasonable need for spousal support

and alimony and the defendant has reasonable income to assist the
plaintiff.

It is reasonable that plaintiff be awarded reasonable

alimony and spousal support.
9.

The parties have acquired a home and real property during

the course of the parties marriage located at 4416 Raymond Ct,
Taylorsville, Utah.

It is reasonable that said real property and

assets be divided between the parties in a fair and equitable
manner.
10.

The parties have acquired an interest in various items of

personal property including, but not limited to, an interest in
Auto Trend furniture, furniture, furnishing, appliances, bank and
retirement

accounts, automobiles

and

travel

trailer, stocks,

securities, and other assets. It is reasonable that said personal
property and assets be divided between the parties in a fair and
equitable manner.
11.

The parties have acquired various debts and obligations

incurred during the marriage. It is reasonable that said debts and
obligations should be divided between the parties in a fair and
equitable manner.
12.

Plaintiff is without sufficient income or resources to

pay for reasonable attorney's fees and court costs incurred in
bringing this action.

Therefore, the defendant should pay such

fees and costs.
13.

Each party should be ordered to do whatever is necessary

to implement the terms of the Decree of Divorce to be entered
herein, including but not limited to transferring all necessary
items of property, titles, deeds, documents or any other item
necessary to comply with the terms of the Decree of Divorce.
WHEREFORE the plaintiffs prays for the following relief:
1.

A Decree of Divorce should be entered pursuant to the

terms of plaintiff's complaint;
2.

For the Decree of Divorce to become final upon entry; and

3.

For such further relief as the Court deems proper and

just.
DATED this

</

day of October, 1996

L. G. CUTLER
Attorney for Plaintiff

Plaintiff Address:
4416 Raymond Ct.
Taylorsville, Utah 84119

2.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 2

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
3.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
4.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 4

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
5.

The Defendant admits that he has employed by Yellow Freight

Company, admits that he also is self employed as a car salesman, but denies
each and eveiy other allegation contained in paragraph 5 of the Plaintiffs
Complaint.
6.

The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 6

and further alleges that the Plaintiff is capable of being fully employed.
7.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 7

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
8.

The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 8

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
9.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained m paragraph 9

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
10.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 10

STEPHEN W. COOK. USB #0720
STEPHEN W. COOK. P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
323 South 600 East. Suite 200
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 595-8600

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TERRY DEE SNARR.

:
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNETH GUY SNARR.
Defendant.

:

Civil No. 964904304

:

Judge Ann M. Stirba

The Defendant, Kenneth Guy Snarr, hereby answers the Plaintiffs Complaint
as follows:

The Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a cause of action against the Defendant
upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
1.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
11.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 11

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
12.

The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
13.

The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 13

of the Plaintiffs Complaint.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays that a Decree of Divorce be
entered in accordance with terms of his Answer.
DATED this

/ / day of February, 1997.

STEPHEN W. COOK
Attorney for Defendant

$

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says:
That he is the attorney for Defendant herein; and that he served the
attached ANSWER TO COMPLAINT upon:
L.G. CUTLER
560 East 200 South. Suite 220
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102
by placing a tme and correct copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the
same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States
mail at Salt Lake City. Utah, on the / ^ day of February. 1997.

STEPHEN W. COOK
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ?2~ day of February. 1997.
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RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
R.5-8
February 14, 1997
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APPELLANT'S REQUESTED TRANSCRIPT
Certified Copy
Proceedings of August 12, 1999
(R.237)
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

L. G. CUTLER (078 9)
Attorney for Petitioner
5995 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 261-3407
Facsimile: (801) 261-3503

APR 1 4 1999
«ALT LAKE COUNTY

.

-^/^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TERRY DEE SNARR,

:

Petitioner,

:

REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT

vs.

: Third District No. 964904304 DA

KENNETH GUY SNARR,

: Appellate Case No. 990285-CA

Respondent.

:

TO THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT EXECUTIVE:
Please take notice that the Petitioner, by and through her
counsel of record, L. G. Cutler, hereby requests a transcript
be prepared of the a portion of the proceedings held herein.
More specifically, Petitioner has requested a transcript be
prepared of the proceedings held on August 12, 1998 before the
Honorable Ann Stirba, presiding, including those matters heard
before the Court in chambers.

Petitioner shall make full payment

of the transcript requested and make satisfactory financial
arrangements in advance.
Petitioner further requests that you acknowledge receipt of
this request and to notify the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals
of the date on which you expect to file the transcript and of the

date on which you file the transcript.
A copy of this Request for Transcript is further provided to
the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals and counsel for appellee.
DATED this / j 7 day of April, 1999,

L. G. CUTLER
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed by first class
mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Request of Transcript, on this J3__

day of April, 1999, to

Stephen W. Cook, Attorney for Respondent, at 323 South 600 East,
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
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CERTIFIED COPY
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TERRY DEE SNARR,

Petitioner,

:

: Third District No. 964904304 DA

vs.

: Appellate Case No. 990285-CA

KENNETH GUY SNARR,

:

Respondent.

:

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 12th day of August,
1998, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before
the HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA, sitting as Judge in the abovenamed Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the
following proceedings were had.
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For the Plaintiff

L.G. Cutler
Attorney at Law
5995 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, UT 84123

For the Defendant:

Stephen W. Cook
Attorney at Law
323 South 600 East, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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3

1 II

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT: Let's go on the record in the matter of

3

Snarr vs. Snarr, Case No. 964904304.

4

presence of both parties and their respective counsel, L.G.

5

Cutler for petitioner, Steven W. Cook for respondent.

g

is actually the time set for the trial in this matter.

7
8
9
10

Court notes the

This

Before I took the bench this morning at 9:30, counsel
indicated they wanted to meet with me and I did meet with
them in chambers.

It was off the record.

At that time Mr.

Cook indicated that he had on Monday, this is Wednesday,
filed a Motion to Dismiss based on a failure to comply with

11
the statute 30-1-4.5 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended and
12
in that conference he indicated that he was relying on the
13
case of Bunch vs. Anglehorn and that's 906 P2nd 918 and that
14
the issue being raised is jurisdictional.
15
I had not received a copy of the Motion or seen
16
the original or was otherwise aware of it.

I believe Mr.

17
Cutler was aware of the motion and he also indicated he was
18
going to be relying on the case of Hansen v. Hansen 342 Utah
19
Advanced Reports 25 filed May 7, 1998.
20
21
22
23
24

25

I have and Counsel

graciously supplied me with a copy of each of these cases
which I have now read.

At that time I asked Mr. Cutler if

he was prepared to argue the motion and he indicated that he
was.

I do not have a memorandum filed in opposition for

I this motion, but I understand that the parties are ready to

4
1 II argue this motion nonetheless.

Is that correct, Counsel,

2

have I stated everything -- have I summarized everything

3

that we talked about in chambers and done so accurately?

4

MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor.

5

MR. CUTLER: That is accurate, Your Honor.

g
7
8
9

I would

just supplement that obviously this motion be brought at the
end of my case in chief and I am prepared to argue that.

I

am not waiving the timeliness issue or what other
information I might have been able to provide you had I had
an opportunity to provide a memoranda.

10
THE COURT: Well, a motion is jurisdictional.

A

11
jurisdictional claim can be raised at any time.

The motion

12
is not timely in the sense that it should have been filed
13
more than 3 0 days prior to the day of trial and I prepared,
14
if you are requesting it, to give you a continuance to file
15
a written response to this motion and otherwise prepare
16
adequately to respond to it, but if you do not wish to have
17
a continuance, then I will deem that as not a valid waiver,
18
you know, I believe that you have waived your right to claim
19
additional time to respond to it.
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. CUTLER: I am not requesting a continuance,
Your Honor.

I was simply, because Mr. Cock claims this is a

jurisdictional motion we dispute that but we are prepared to
argue it.
THE COURT: All right.

I will hear argument about

5
1 I! this.

It is my understanding that, and I need to be clear

2

if there is any dispute about when this petition was filed

3

or anything bearing on the time that various documents were

4

filed.

5

taking the bench.

8
9
10

Also, before

MR. CUTLER: I think the three factual items we

6
7

I have read through the Court file.

could probably agree to is the parties separated on July 7,
1996.

This action was filed on October -THE COURT: 7, 1996, I believe.
MR. CUTLER: -- '96 about three months later.

There was a request for trial setting filed with the Court
11
in January of '97 and there has not been a jurisdictional
12
order in regard to this matter or in regard to the statute
13
since the filing of the action.
14
MR. COOK: I could agree to those so long as we are
15
clear that what we are talking about with respect to the
16
latter fact is that there has been no administrative order
17
or judicial order either during the course of the marriage
18
19
20
21

or within one year after the parties separated.
MR. CUTLER: Correct.

We can agree to those facts.

THE COURT: Very well, then.

With that you may

argue the motion.

22

MR. COOK: Your Honor, I'll be very brief in terms

23

of my opening (inaudible) and reserve some time to rebuttal

24

because I think our motion is very clear on its face. It's a

25

6
1 II Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12B(1) for lack of subject
2

matter jurisdiction under the statute Section 30-1-4.5 the

3

law is clear that in order for common law marriages to be

4

valid one necessary element is that there be a judicial

5

determination or administrative order entered during the

6

period of the marriage or the relationship, I should say, or

7
8

within one year following the termination of that
relationship which admittedly is not here in this case.
Those precise facts have went up on appeal to the

9
10

Court of Appeals in a bunch of cases and I submit it to the
Court and as I read the bunch of cases, the Court indicated

11
that that is true.

That's what the legislature intended in

12
it's purest subject matter jurisdictional in nature and
13
dismissed the action.
14
THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Cutler?

15
MR. CUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I

16
dispute whether or not it is subject matter jurisdiction.
17
It is a remedy that may or may not have been available had
18
the parties properly pled it.

If I could have the Court

19
refer to both the complaint and the answer for a moment and
20

specifically defendant's answer.

21
22
23
24
25

Paragraph 2 of the Petitioner, now petitioner's
complaint is that plaintiff and defendant are wife and
husband, having been first married in 1969, later divorced
in 1980.

However, they continued to reside together and

8

is not a prayer for dismissal.

Their prayer for relief on

page 3 of the answer is: "Wherefore, defendant prays that a
decree of divorce be entered in accordance with the terms of
his answer."

That is in essence a request and, again, an

admission that there is a marriage as previously admitted.
The other issues that raise prejudice, Your Honor,
is as outlined in the Hansen case there are several factual
and legal issues that would have to presented today.
Whether or not these individuals have a reputation within
the community as husband and wife, how they refer to
themselves, and that evidence would have to be brought in by
third parties or other documents.

That we are not prepared

to bring in that type of those witnesses and that issue has
never been raised in either of our discovery requests or our
responses to their discovery requests.
Finally, Your Honor, if the Court believes that
there is a jurisdictional question first of all, and second
of all, that this isn't otherwise waived, then the issue is,
then there is a constitutional challenge that needs to be
brought here and that has a double effect upon petitioners.
First of all, it's a constitutional challenge that
obviously needs to be argued in detail.

That's why I am not

waiving the memorandum necessary to raise that issue, to try
and reap a constitutional question or 48 hour notice of what
you are trying to get prepared for trial I think is

9
1 II descriptive in and of itself.
2

The second reason is that to challenge a statute

3

you have to give notice to the Attorney General's office so

4

they can come in here and defend the statute and we

5

obviously have not been able to do that or provide the

6

requisite notice to the Attorney General's office to raise a

-

constitutional challenge.
THE COURT: Where is that required?

8

MR. CUTLER: I believe in the judicial code, Your

9
Honor.

If you raise a constitutional challenge --

10
THE COURT: Well, you need to cite me to a
11
provision.
12
MR. CUTLER: Okay.

I will do so, but, again,

13
that's the issue of prejudice and the issue of presenting
14
all the issues before the Court properly grieved and et
15
cetera.

This is a constitutional question if the Court gets

16
to that point.

The constitutional question is firmly raised

17
in the footnotes of both cases that the Court has referred
18
to.

This is an access of Court's issue.

If the Court

19
believes that these two parties who properly and timely
20
21
22
23
24
25

filed a divorce, both of them asked this Court for a
divorce, then three months in separation and they have
continued to move forward in that course, they requested a
trial setting for a decree of divorce within seven months,
excuse me, January, six, seven months of the filing of this

10
1 II action and we have been waiting for that trial date.
2

There have been no continuances brought by either

3

party in this matter and we are talking about an access of

4

Courts and the Court and the Court of Appeals in both cases

5

raises that very constitutional issue.

6

through the four hoops to get to that point, I think there

7
8
9
10
11

So, before we step

is many reasons why the Court will say this matter is way,
it's otherwise not a material issue that has been properly
pled before the Court is a material issue of fact and law
that the respondent's have previously admitted to.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.

Mr. Cook?

MR. COOK: I'll address counsel's arguments in the
12
same order, Your Honor.
13
With respect to the pleadings, there have been
14
open pleadings, Mr. Cutler did not set forth all of the
15
elements of a common law marriage, for example, whether or
16
not they are capable of giving consent, legal, capable of
17
entering into a solemnized marriage.

He didn't allege that

18
they cohabited and that they held themselves out.

He failed

19
to allege the elements I just mentioned as well as the -20
THE COURT: Well, wait just a moment here.

Wait

21
just a moment.
22
23
24

25

MR. COOK: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: Clearly the answer concedes the issue
[J of whether there was a common law marriage.

How can your

11
client now after having conceded this point in his answer
now come back in the same case and claim that there wasn't a
common law marriage.

Why shouldn't your client be stopped

from raising that challenge.
MR. COOK: Your Honor, I believe what you are
referring to is paragraph 2 of the complaint.

And as I read

paragraph 2 he alleged there was a marriage, which we
concede.

There was a marriage.

In fact, in 1980. That

they divorced and they subsequently commenced living
together.
THE COURT: No.

However, they continued to reside

together and held themselves out as husband and wife from
February 198 0 to the day they separated on approximately
July 7, 1996, held themselves out as husband and wife.
MR. COOK: That is correct, which is the fourth
element under Section 30-1-4-5, which I thought that he was
alleging, which we admit to. We admit that they held
themselves out as husband and wife.
had a joint checking account.

I'll admit they even

Whether or not there was a

contract entered into between the parties as required by the
statute is wholly debatable.

Whether or not there was any -

THE COURT: All right.
statute are what?

The other elements of the

You were going through those before.

MR. COOK: Number one, that they are capable of

12
1 II giving consent; number two, are legally capable of entering
2

into a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this

3

chapter which is the marriage chapter.

4

(D) mutually assumed marital rights, duties and obligations,

5

(E), who hold themselves out and then have acquired a

6

7
8

® is cohabitating.

uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.

And the

last is that they make this determination that there be a
judicial order of termination made within one year of ending
their marriage.

9
So, I admitted everything that he pled.

10

is, he didn't plead enough.

The point

That's why we said it didn't

11
set forth an (inaudible) defense, that their case failed to
12
(inaudible) -13
THE COURT: And where does it say that?
14
MR. COOK: That's first affirmative offense.
15
THE COURT: All right. And then in your prayer for
16
relief your client prays that a decree of divorce be entered
17
18

in accordance with the terms of his answer.

like he is recognizing that there is a marriage.

19
20

That sounds

MR. COOK: Your Honor, I'll be very candid with
you.

This whole area is up in the air.

My understanding on

21

the practice in this district as well as in other districts

22

is that attorneys faced with this one year limitation

23

petition the judges to have a hearing on the marriage

24

ZD

relationship within one year, and that's the critical

13
1 II question.

2

At the time we filed that answer there was a case

3

called Hansen v. Hansen, 1950 -- I have got it here.

4

very old case.

5

determined to be void because one of the parties had failed

g

to get a divorce before they remarried.

7
8
9
10

It's a

In that particular case the marriage was

And the parties

came into court and tried that case as a divorce case.

On

appeal the Utah Supreme Court said, "Well, if the parties
consent to issues, then the Court has equitable jurisdiction
to decide those issues that they consent to have decided."
In other words, I think that if we came to you and

11

said, "We consent to have you look at the property matters
12
and have the Court enter a division, an equitable division
13
of the property, I would submit they have jurisdiction to do
14
that.
15
So, when we were framing our answer in this case,
16
I had the Hansen case in mind that maybe that's what you
17
were going to do is to come in here and litigate the issues
18
of property and things of that nature.

There is no type of

19
consent that there is a valid solemnized marriage or the
20

equivalent of a common law statute.

21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: All right.

You may address the other

issues.
MR. COOK: With respect to prejudice, Your Honor, I
think the question there is obviously that Mr. Cutler

14
requires some more time to ask the attorney general to come
--by the way, I think that's a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (inaudible) Civil Procedure, but if he wishes to
do that I think this is an important question that needs to
be addressed by the Court and it certainly would give him
whatever time he needs to address that.
As far as the constitutionality question, of
course the first proposition is that the Court must presume
that the statute is constitutional.

The burden is on, in

this case, the petitioner to demonstrate that the statute is
unconstitutional.

Then it must go and address the specific

provision of whether or not as he's alleged, the open courts
provision has been violated.

In our view, it has not

because you'd have to put this in the context of what a
common law marriage is.

Context is this: That historically

this State recognized that there is only one way to have a
valid marriage and that was to go through what I call a
traditional marriage.

That is, be tested, put in for a

license, jump through the hoops, have an appropriate person
to minister the wedding, the proper certificate put on the
file with the proper authorities, and the State had a
(inaudible) interest in those procedures because what we are
talking about ultimately is the legitimization or
(inaudible) of children, whether or not these parties have
any rights in terms of alimony which is a unique marital

15
1 II right and other things such as retirement, it's a State
2

employee.

3

question.

4

I mean this is a very broad, wide ranging

The State has an interest in regulating that and

5

so a nineteen day, seven, I believe it was when the

6

legislature considered this issue, it decided that, well, if

7

people would want to allege a common law marriage and escape
the rules that we have established historically in the State

9

for over a hundred years, then they must do it in a very
precise, mechanical way.

And that's why they enacted the

10
statute the way that they did.
11
And I think the reason they left this one year
12
window open is because this question is so important.

I

13
don't know of any decision in life that's more important
14
than marriage and a State has a fundamental right to
15
regulate marriages.

They have an opportunity to come in

16
court within one year.

Fact is, the respondent here didn't

17
petition to have the matter heard within one year.
18
19

20
21
22

certainly doesn't violate the open courts provision in our
judgment.

So given the background and why the legislature

enacted the act in the matter that it did, we feel that the
constitutional challenges, that's out of the question.
THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Cutler, maybe I didn't

23

understand what you said you were not waiving.

24

that you are not waiving?

25

That

Was it is

16
1 II

MR. CUTLER: Your Honor, the right to respond by

2

memorandum, if necessary to address certainly the

3

constitutional issue which should be (inaudible) if we get

4

to that point, but I am prepared to argue about this issue

5

of waiver and whether or not the four corners of the

g

pleadings they stand on their own and my point to the court

7
8
9
10

is simply their prayer for relief was giving a decree of
divorce and now that's changed 48 hours previously without
any other prior filed.
THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that this does
require additional briefing.

I am concerned about, actually

11
the constitutional issue seems to be addressed, well, it's
12
not, yes or no, addressed by the Court of Appeals.

It

13
indicates at the trial court, the issue is not preserved in
14
the trial court and therefore it wasn't specifically
15
addressed but in the footnote they indicated that a narrow
16
area in which they had constitutional concerns and I don't,
17
you know, whether you can infer that there is some other
18
constitutional concern they have about the statute as it was
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

presented on the facts is open to some question, I suppose.
But, the other area in which I have some question
is in the area of judicial estoppel.

Whether in this case

given the prayer for relief and what is alleged, whether the
respondent: is judicially estopped from denying existence of
I a common law marriage based on the pleadings and I have a

17
1 II question about that under the facts of this case.

So, I

2

need some additional briefing with regard to these various

3

aspects of the motion.

4

jurisdictional issue, assuming it is a jurisdictional issue

5

can be raised at any time/ it is under the Code of Judicial

g

Administration, motions must be filed at least 30 days prior

-

to trial.

8
9

I'd also note that although a

This was filed two days prior to trial.

That

made all of this argument much more difficult and the issues
were ripe months ago for the filing of this motion.
Having said all of that, I am going to take this

10
motion under advisement.

I may even require that although I

11
have considered this motion at this time, I may require that
12
this first be submitted to the commissioner as required
13
under the Code of Judicial Administration and reargue it
14
before the commissioner first and then present it.

So, the

15
only question now is whether to proceed with the trial or
16
whether to

continue the trial and the parties are ready to

17
proceed to trial, is that correct?
18
MR. CUTLER:
19

MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor.

20
21
22
23
24
25

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.
continuance or shall we proceed?

Is there any request for a
Is there a stipulation to

proceed?
MR. CUTLER: May I confer with counsel for just a
moment, Your Honor?

18
1 II

THE COURT:

Yes .

2

MR. CUTLER: Your Honor, because we have been

3

waiting for a moment.

4

patience for just a quick two minute recess so I can speak

5

to my client?
THE COURT: Yes.

6

MR. CUTLER: This has a major attack on her,

7
8

Could I impose upon the Court's

obviously.
THE COURT: If you need too.

9

(Recess)

10

THE COURT: All right.

We are on the record in the

11
matter of Snarr v. Snarr.

The record should reflect the

12
Court is in session in chambers.

The parties are not

13
present.

Counsel came in and we've had a brief discussion.

14
We're making record of that discussion now.

Mr. Cutler came

15
in and indicated that he felt that it was appropriate for
16
him to be given the time to do a full briefing of the issues
17
that were raised by this motion today and therefore, albeit
18
reluctantly, is requesting a continuance of the trial and
19
reluctantly it appears to me based on the fact that the
20
21
22
23
24
25

parties were ready for trial, the trial had to be continued
once before and I presume and infer from all of this that
they are at least Ms. Snarr is anxious to proceed to the
trial.

The respondent is not objecting to this given that

it was respondent who filed the motion just two days before

19
the trial.
2 II

Have I summarized this fairly accurate?

3

MR. CUTLER: That's accurate, Your Honor.

4

MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor.

5

THE COURT: Okay.

6

7
8
9

Accurately?

And the issues that

need to be briefed are the constitutionality of the statute
as applied to the facts in this case and also the issue of
whether by virtue of the pleadings or other conduct of the
parties in the record known to counsel there has been a
concession by respondent that there was a common law

10
marriage, not just to an element or even a couple of
11
elements, but whether there has been a concession as to
12
whether there is a common law marriage.

And as to this, I

13
would expect this really to take the form, it's more raised
14
in the matter of a Motion for Summary -- or at least the
15
response today challenges by looking to the pleadings, is
16
claiming that reasonable inferences drawn from the answer
17
and the complaint when read in conjunction with one another
18
and the prayer for relief suggests that there was a
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

concession to the issue of whether there was a common law
marriage and that the respondent was focusing on the terms
of a divorce decree as opposed to contesting the existence
of a common law marriage.

Is that all clear?

So I want

that fully briefed.
Then, when that's submitted -- I want you to

20
1 II submit it for decision so that I am aware of that.

Send a

2

cover letter with it reminding me that it's this case and at

3

that time I will make a determination as to whether I

4

consider the motion or refer it to the domestic relations

5

commissioner for consideration first before it comes back to

6

the Court.
So, based on all of this, and I am reluctant to do

7
8
9

it too, because I know the parties were prepared to go to
trial.

I certainly was prepared to hear the trial.

But the

issues are of vital importance it seems to be to both
10
parties and it involves an attack on the constitutionality
11
of the statute.

So, given the high stakes involved, the

12
length of the relationship that we are talking about here I
13
think that this needs full and careful deliberation and this
14
process will accommodate that and I don't see a way of
15
accommodating that goal without striking the trial and
16
proceeding in this fashion.
17
So, I would appreciate it if you would explain
18
this to your clients and I will strike the trial date and
19
not reset another trial date at this time although if the
20
21
22
23
24
25

motion is not granted I will do everything in my power to
get the earliest possible trial date for a resolution of
these issues.

Certainly, anything I can do to speed the

process along in terms of consideration of motion, whether
it's before me or before a commissioner, I'll do that as

21
1 II well.
2

I want to get this matter resolved as I'm sure your

clients do and you do too.

3

Is there anything else we need to discuss?

4

MR. COOK: Your Honor, in terms of protocol and in

5

terms of briefing time, what is your thought?
THE COURT: Let me ask you this: In view of the

6

7

8
9

issues that you know exist, do you wish to amend your motion
in any way.

Right now, it's just (inaudible) Motion to

Dismiss.
MR. COOK: I don't know that I am prepared to

10
answer that right now, but I would certainly do so by the
11
end of the week, let me put it that way.
12
THE COURT: If you intend to file an amended motion
13
to dismiss, then do so on or before August 14, that's
14
Friday.

Then you shall have until August 24 to file a

15
memorandum in opposition and then five days to file any
16
reply memorandum and then submit it for a decision by cover
17
letter.
18
MR. CUTLER: With cover letter.
19
THE COURT: Okay.
20
21
22
23
24
25

Thank you very much.

MR. COOK: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. CUTLER: Thanks, Judge.
(Proceedings concluded)
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE I, SECTION 11

33

Utah State Constitution
Article I, Section 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.
(c) 1953-1998 LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed
Elsevier Inc.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 3 0 - 1 - 4 . 5

34

(1987)

Utah Code Annotated
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to
this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or
administrative order establishes that it arises out of a
contract between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized
marriage under the provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and
obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage
under this section must occur during the relationship
described in Subsection (1), or within one year following
the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marria
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any
form, and may be proved under the same general rules of
evidence as facts in other cases.
History: C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 246,
2.
(c) 1953-1998 LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed
Elsevier Inc.

SUMMARY OF
UTAH STATE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
S.B. 156
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SUMMARY
S.B.I 56
RECOGNITION OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGES

Summary of the Bill
The bill provides that a marriage that is not formally solemnized is valid if:
1. It arises out of a contract between two consenting parties.
2. The parties are capable of giving consent. That isf they are not minors,
mentally ill, mentally retarded, or otherwise incapacitated.
3. The parties are legally capable of being married.
Utah law prohibits
incestuous marriages, marriages between persons with certain venereal
diseases, the marriage of party who is already married and homosexual
marriages.
4. The parties have cohabitated. Courts have held that cohabitation is a
necessary element of a common law marriage. It is evidence that the other
elements may or do exist. The length or type of cohabitation may vary.
5. The parties mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations.
6. The pa/tics hold themselves out as being married and have acquired the
reputation of being married.
Under the proposed amendment, all of these elements must be found to exist by a
court or administrative hearing officer or body, before the common law marriage is
actually recognized as valid for all purposes.
Objections to the Dill
Once a common law marriage has been found to exist by a court or administrative
order, it is treated as any other marriage for all purposes.
Polygamy Passage of the bill would not legalize polygamy. The bill requires that
the two persons must be "legally capable of being married." If a person had solemnized a
marriage to one person and was living with another person in a polygamous arrangement,
they would not considered to be married because they are legally unable to do so. If a
person was married under common law, he would also be incapable of legally entering into
any other marriage.

Adoption Utah law states that "any minor child may be adopted by any adult
person.11 Consent for the adoption must be obtained from both natural parents of the
child. Currently, the father of a child born out of wedlock may claim rights to the child.
If a common law marriage were established, his consent to the adoption would be
necessary unless other statutory exceptions exist.
Paternity There are other statutes dealing with paternity and the responsiblity of
parents to support children. This bill would have no impact on current paternity or child
support laws. Support of children born from a common law marriage is also provided for in
paternity and child support collection statutes, but those statues would not conflict with
the common law marrige provisions—there would simply be more alternatives.
Probate Once a court has established that a common law marriage exists, the
beneficiary has the same rights to the deceased spouse's estate as would a person in a
solemnized marriage.
Cohabitation Requirement
Cohabitation is generally required as an element of a valid common-law marriage,
mostly because it is valid evidence, and a basis for showing that two people have initially
assumed marital rights and duties, and are holding themselves out as being married.
Short relationships or ,fone night stands" would not fall into this category. There
must be an open and conscious association as husband and wife.
Courts have not
established a minimum time that two people must live together before a common-law
marriage is valid.
What Other States Do
Idaho, Montana, Kansas, and Iowa, among others, have broad provisions for "common
law" marriages
Welfare Savings to the State
A significant problem in our public assistance system is the "man in the house"
situation. There are ab^ut 300 AFDC cases where this situation applies. Under federal
regulations, a person who is residing with but not married to the mother of dependent
children must only sign an affidavit stating he is not providing support. If this is done,, the
state cannot count his income in determining eligibility for welfare.
If these "man in the house" cases were to come under the provisons of this bill, this
could save the state government about $325,000 and the federal government $900,000 for
a total savings of $1,225,000.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 6

Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of
any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be
included. The last day of the period so computed shall be
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the
next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is
less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and
legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice
given thereunder or by order of the court an act is required
or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged
if request therefor is made before the expiration of the
period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous
order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure
to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not
extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b),
52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except
to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of
time provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any
proceeding is not affected or limited by the continued
existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued
existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects
the power of a court to do any act or take any proceeding in
any civil action which has been pending before it.
(d) For motions - Affidavits. A written motion, other
than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before
the time specified for the hearing, unless a different
period is fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of
the court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex
parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit,
the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except
as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may
be served not later than 1 day before the hearing, unless

the court permits them to be served at some other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a
party has the right or is required to do some act or take
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the
service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice
or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added
to the prescribed period.
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(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality,
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release,
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations,
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated
a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense,
the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the
pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 9
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters.
(a) (1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the
capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the
legal existence of an organized association of persons that
is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as
to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue
or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by
specific negative averment, which shall include such
supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the
pleader's knowledge, and on such issue the party relying on
such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall
establish the same on the trial.
(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party
does not know the name of an adverse party, he may state
that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party
may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name;
provided, that when the true name of such adverse party is
ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended
accordingly.
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of
unknown parties. In an action to quiet title wherein any of
the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the
pleadings may describe such unknown persons as "all other
persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or
interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the
pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding
his title thereto."
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance
or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to
aver generally that all conditions precedent have been
performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or
occurrence shall be made specifically and with
particularity, and when so made the party pleading the
performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish the
facts showing such performance or occurrence.
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official

document or act it is sufficient to aver that the document
was issued or the act done in compliance with law.
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a
domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver
the judgment or decision without setting forth matter
showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction
shall be made specifically and with particularity and when
so made the party pleading the judgment or decision shall
establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional
facts.
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the
sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are
material and shall be considered like all other averments of
material matter.
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are
claimed, they shall be specifically stated.
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of
limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing
the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause
of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied
on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and
definitely by section number, subsection designation, if
any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon
sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is
controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish,
on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is
so barred.
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a
private statute of this state, or an ordinance of any
political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such
statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such
statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage
or by its section number or other designation in any
official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The
court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof.
(j) Libel and slander.
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary
in an action for libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic
facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the
defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it is
sufficient to state generally that the same was published or
spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is
controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must
establish, on the trial, that it was so published or spoken.

(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for
libel or slander, the defendant may allege both the truth of
the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating
circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether
he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence
the mitigating circumstances.
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses
and objections which he does not present either by motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense
of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection
of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be
made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits,
and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of
the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction
of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be
disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any
evidence that may have been received.

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
RULE 4-501

Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions,
supporting memoranda and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and
scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district
courts except proceedings before the court commissioners and
small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions
for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(A) M6tion and supporting memoranda. All motions,
except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied
by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other
documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda
supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages
in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the
court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is
made to file an over-length memorandum, the application
shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if
the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application
shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed
five pages.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in
opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation.
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of
the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to submit
the matter to the court for decision as provided in

paragraph (1)(d) of this rule.
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve
and file a reply memorandum within five days after service
of the responding party's memorandum.
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be
in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned
"Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall
contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither
party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points
and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment
shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement
of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of
the record upon which the movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which the party contends a
genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to
those portions of the record upon which the opposing party
relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered
sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without
a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or requested by the
parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues in the action on the
merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing
the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a
motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court

finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the motion is
frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues
governing the granting or denial of the motion has been
authoritatively decided.
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court
shall notify the requesting party. When a request for
hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for
hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall
be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter
for hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of points and
authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the
motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at
least two working days before the date set for hearing.
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and
indicate the date and time of the hearing. Courtesy copies
shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at
the time the parties file their principal memoranda, a
hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least
thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No
dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without
leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice
and for good cause shown, the court may grant a request for
an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the
essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise
significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion
or at a party's request may direct arguments of any motion
by telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim
record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the
rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
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